THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION

I. THE MADERO REVOLT (1910-11) "SPONTANEOUS" MASS UPRISING FIZZLES ON 20 NOV. 1910

A. SMALL RURAL UPRISINGS IN CHIHUAHUA, DURANGO, MORELOS = SURVIVAL OF INSURGENCY

B. REVOLUTIONARY COALITION EMERGES:

1. SONORA-COAHUILA: UPPER-CLASS/MIDDLE-CLASS REVOLUTIONARIES

a. PROGRAM:

(1) political changes to incorporate/empower "OUTS"

(2) democratic reforms to stabilize Mexican society

(3) no substantial social reform/pro-economic modernization

b. COMPOSITION:

(1) agri-business/elite: Maderos/Mayotorenas

(2) Anti-Reelectionist Party as cadre (urban middle-class)

(3) limited base in countryside: i.e. used hacienda retainers as soldiers

2. MORELOS-CHIHUAHUA-DURANGO: LOWER-CLASS/MIDDLE-CLASS REVOLUTIONARIES

a. Morelos

1. Program: Land Reform/Village Autonomy

(a) village communal lands usurped by haciendas

(b) failed to get redress from Diaz govt.

(2) Composition: traditional village society/local leader was EMILIANO ZAPATA/traditional enemies of hacendados

(3) no formal ties with MADERO movement/but hopeful

b. Chihuahua

(1) composition:

(a) frustrated middle-class: seek mobility; grievances focused against TERRAZAS family; leader is ABRAHAM GONZALEZ

(b) mixed lower-class: cowboys, miners, peons, villagers: economic distress;/more heterogeneous than Morelos movement

(2) leadership: PASCUAL OROZCO--arriero; PANCHO VILLA: bandit-revolutionary

(3) programs: unclear: personal opportunism/land questions/rich v. poor/nationalism, etc.

c. Durango

(1) composition: villagers of Ocuila, Cuencamé, Santiago Papasquiaro, etc., but overall more heterogeneous than Morelos w/important agrarian radical leadership core (contrast w/Chihuahua)/links w/PLM/few formal links w/Madero but many promises

(2) program: grievances similar to Morelos/interest in land reform/local political autonomy

II. DEMISE OF MADERO COALITION (1911-13)

A. MADERO SOUGHT TO KEEP PORFIRIAN SYSTEM W/O DIAZ

1. NO PROTRACTED MILITARY CAMPAIGN TO UNSEAT DIAZ

2. NO CHANGES IN GOVT. BUREAUCRACY OR MILITARY

3. ATTEMPTED DEMOBILIZATION OF REVOLUTIONARY FORCES

4. FAILED TO OFFER SUBSTANTIVE SOCIAL-ECONOMIC REFORMS

5. ATTEMPTED TO REPRESS POPULAR MOVEMENTS THAT EMERGED AS RESULT OF MADERO REVOLT IN CHIHUAHUA, DURANGO, MORELOS, ETC.

B. REBELLIONS AGAINST MADERO

1. EMILIANO ZAPATA

a. sought village autonomy & land reform

b. rebel after Madero attempts to disarm

c. military campaign by Federal army fails to destroy movement

2. PASCUAL OROZCO

a. prominent leader of Madero forces in Chihuahua (was mule-skinner)

b. rebelled when not rewarded sufficiently

c. mixed coalition: agrarian revolutionaries & TERRAZAS FAMILY

d. defeated by Gen. Huerta in Summer 1912

3. BERNARDO REYES/FELIX DIAZ

a. former Porfirian "INS" now political "OUTS"

b. represents interests of those threatened by prospect of moderate reform/weakness of Madero in crushing rural rebellions

c. benefitted by growing hostility of Taft administration to Madero: too much disorder threatened U.S. interests

d. initial revolts fail, but secret support of U.S. Ambassador Wilson for military conspiracy in Feb. 1913--"Decena Trágica"

4. VICTORIANO HUERTA

a. career officer in Porfirian army: success in campaigns against Madero foes (Orozquistas) in 1912

b. with complicity of Henry Lane Wilson: arrests Madero, forces resignation of his govt., murders Madero & VP, assumes power

III. THE HUERTA GOVERNMENT (1913-14)

A. CRITICAL MOMENT IN REVOLUTIONARY PROCESS: MUST SMOTHER OPPOSITION OR WILL DEVELOP MORE MOMENTUM TOWARDS REVOLUTIONARY TRANSFORMATION

B. HUERTA FAILS:

1. POPULAR PRESSURES TOO STRONG: MURDER OF MADERO RESURRECTS MADERO REVOLUTIONARY COALITION IN COMBINED EFFORT TO BRING DOWN HUERTA

2. UNSTABLE COALTION:

a. CARRANZA: (CONSTITUTIONALISTS)

(1) conservative, upper-class/ legacy in Madero Revolt; little interest in authentic reform; proclaimed self as Supreme Leader of the Revolution

(2) supported by Alvaro Obregon & Sonoran army of Northwest; Pablo Gonzalez army in Northeast

b. VILLA: (CONSTITUTIONALISTS)

(1) original social base in rural lower-class communities of Northern Mexico (Chihuahua-Durango)

(2) directs transformation of peasant army into professional army: Division del Norte (most powerful)

(3) victorious in critical battles at Torreon, Zacatecas that defeat Huerta by Summer 1914; legend of invincibility grows

(4) death of Madero makes possible reincorporation of agrarian radicals in state like Durango; others initially attempt to reach accomodation with Huerta (i.e. former Orozquistas)

c. ZAPATA:

(1) remain separate from Constitutionalist movement (had been in rebellion to Madero in 1913); aided by division of federal forces to northern campaigns

(2) retains peasant army; local concerns; massive land reform in Morelos

d. UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT: OPPOSITION BY WOODROW WILSON TO HUERTA PRESIDENCY

(1) basis:

(A) saw democracy as stabilizer

(B) fear European influence

(C) belief in U.S. omnipotence

(D) pressures from U.S. interests (oil,land)

(2) initiatives

(A) lifts arms embargo for rebels/open border

(B) discouraged European assistance

(C) occupation of Veracruz: pretext Tampico incident (fiscal drain/political embarassment) (backfired)

IV. DECOMPOSITION OF CONSTITUTIONALIST MOVEMENT

A. RIVALRY OF CARRANZA V. VILLA: ACUTE BY SUMMER 1914

B. AGUASCALIENTES CONVENTION (OCT. 1914): FAILS TO RESOLVE CONFLICT: CIVIL WAR

C. CARRANZA RETREATS TO VERACRUZ; VILLA HAS INITIAL ADVANTAGE

D. MAJOR MILITARY CAMPAIGNS IN APR-JUN 1915 DETERMINE OUTCOME

V. DEFEAT OF VILLA/ZAPATA

A. MILITARY

1. Obregon mastery of modern tactics: machine guns, artillery, trenches, obliterate Villista cavalry

2. Covert U.S. intervention: supplies provided to Carranza forces in Veracruz; "embargo"of land ports favors Carranza: have more arms/ammunition in Bajio campaigns

3. Villista logistical/financial collapse: destruction of hda system in North; problems of Villista currency; salaried army quits fighting

4. Zapata army ineffective campaigners outside of Morelos: limitation of peasant army

B. POLITICAL

1. no national program/vision: Villa/Zapata local & regional followings

2. delay by Villa in implementing reform eroded credibility/Carranza took initiative in promising change

3. Carranza used reforms to build popular coalition: i.e. played off urban workers against rural workers (splits working class)

VI. CARRANZA WINS

A. CONSERVATIVE POLICIES

1. Returned confiscated rural estates

2. repressed radical labor

3. negociations/recognition with U.S.

4. Villa attack on Columbus, N.M. as response to complicity? or revenge?

5. intended to provoke crisis w/U.S. & bring down Carranza

6. nationalist reaction to U.S. invasion pushed revolution towards left against wishes of Carranza

B. CONSTITUTION OF 1917

1. Forced on Carranza by left/military in Carranza coalition

2. Provisions

a. recognized peasant right to land/expropriation of large estates (Article 27)

b. sanctioned expropriation of foreign properties/reduced foreign economic & political presence in Mexico (Art. 27, 28)

c. constituted agenda for conflict with U.S: land, property rights, labor relations.

d. intended to prevent imposition of Platt-type amendment for Mexico

(1) U.S. protectorate status was price for U.S. troop withdrawal from Mexico (i.e. U.S. successes elsewhere in region)

(2) outbreak of WW I frustrated plan/prevented extended occupation; made threat of war with Mexico less implausible

(3) U.S. retained enough leverage to prevent immediate implementation (i.e. threat to oil lands, etc.)

e. New constitution provided little immediate political support for Carranza regime

(1) resistance to regime continued; opposition lacked necessary materials of war to topple government (i.e. ammunition in short supply; lacked food/supplies hdas already stripped of livestock, crops

(2) regime also survived because society exhausted, disillusioned by revolution

VI. OBREGON REVOLT: PLAN DE AGUA PRIETA (1919-20)

[accomodation w/Villista & Zapatista movement)

VI. DEFEAT OF DE LA HUERTA REVOLT: MARKED END OF MILITARY PHASE OF MEXICAN REVOLUTION (1923-24)