Land Tenure
Research
Workshop
Sponsored by
INTERREGIONAL LAND TENURE
RESEARCH COMMITTEE
FARM FOUNDATION
Chapter 11
THE VALUE JUDGMENT
AND LAND TENURE RESEARCH
Carl M. Bogholt
Professor of Philosophy,
There
is a widely held theory of the value judgment which asserts that in understanding what takes place when a value
judgment is made, it is of the first importance to distinguish between values
that are extrinsic and those that are intrinsic. A thing may be judged to be valuable simply in and for itself, or intrinsically. It may be judged to be valuable only in its
relation to other things, or extrinsically.
In the former case it is judged as an end, in the latter as a means,
though in many cases a thing may be judged
valuable both as an end and as a means.
The
important bearing of the distinction upon the formation of theories of value
will be clear from the following illustration proposed as instance of inquiry
issuing in value judgment. Suppose a man
to be seated in a dentist’s chair, mouth open, one of his teeth being drilled. Suppose further a query be put to this man
upon his release. "Why do
this?" He will in all probability
not characterize it as an activity that is worthwhile in itself but will justify
it as a means to a further end, let us say, effective mastication of his food.
"But why effective mastication of food,” he may be asked. The reply to this question will be in turn
that this is a means to a more inclusive end, let it be health. Further question and reply will go on in the
same general form until there is posited an lend, let it be happiness, self realization or some other,
which is not itself a means. Some final,
ultimate end which has value in and for itself, or
intrinsic value, is thus supposed, appeal to which is necessary in order to
ground the appraisal of the particular activity of being seated in a dentist’s
chair undergoing :drilling operations.
Things are either good for
something else or simply good in themselves and we -cannot, in the final
analysis, get any justification for the judgment that a thing is good for, or as
a means, without the judgment that something as good in itself, or as end. The task of establishing beyond all doubt the summum bonum is one which philosophers have taken as
their peculiar province, allocating to practical men the
task of discovering the means required to attain the highest good which they
declare.
This
separation of the inquiries appraising things as means from the inquiries
appraising things as ends seems to be assumed by G. A. Lundberg in an-article
entitled Can Scene Validate
Ethics. His remarks are chiefly addressed to those of his scientific
fellow-workers who believe that the results of their work as scientists affords a scientific basis for holding certain ends to be desirable. This is most emphatically not the task of social scientists qua scientists, according to Lundberg. Qua scientist, his is the task of warranting propositions of the form, If A under
conditions D, then B. Such propositions contain no value
expressions whatever, in which respect they are strictly comparable to the
propositions of the natural sciences.
To
be sure, knowledge of this sort is of inestimable value informing propositions
about what are effective means to ends which men as a matter of fact do hold to
be desirable. But it affords no
basis whatever for warranting the validity of the claim that they are
desirable. What intellectual discipline,
if any, Lundberg believes suited to this task is not made clear in the article
under discussion. As has been noted,
some persons, and among such persons are to be numbered many scientists,
believe that it is the function of the intellectual discipline called philosophy
to perform this office.
The
report on the scope and nature of land tenure research prepared by the
Interregional Land Tenure Research Committee and published in 1955 apparently
accepts as sound this notion of the distinction and separation of means inquiries
from end inquiries. Note the following
passages:
"Objectives for appraising
tenure research needs may be based principally upon the assumption that the
following are public ends: (1) maximization of the output from those resources'
devoted to the production of goods and services, (2) elimination ... of abrupt
and unpredicted changes ,in the output and distribution of real goods and
services, and (3) access to rights in land independent of factors other than
the individual personal attributes." (p. 2)
"These functions expected of tenure
arrangements" (namely, efficient resource use, stability of resource
productivity, and equality of access to resources among individuals) "are
obviously developed from the viewpoint of the total society and the total economy. If the land within a nation's borders is to
make a maximum contribution toward the satisfaction of the wants of the
population, tenure ends cannot be ultimate ends but only ends-in-view to the
solution of over-all problems of allocation and use. " (p. 5)
If
I understand the import of these and related passages in this report, what is
asserted, in substance, is that land tenure studies have as their concern the
determination of those tenure arrangements which will serve as effective means
for the realization of the end or ends of efficient and stable land use on
terms of equality of access. These ends
in their turn are indispensable means to an end (taken as .final or
ultimate for the purposes of this research), the satisfaction of human wants,
land being important only as it can contribute to that satisfaction. Efficiency, stability and equality of access
are such important means to the end, that they take on the status of ends and
"are of prime importance unless it can be shown that. other ends are: (1) competitive with the above and (2) can be
achieved more expeditiously through the sacrifice of the above than by any
other means." (p. 6)
Grant
the validity of the assumption that satisfaction of human went is desirable as
a final end. Grant the validity of the assumption that efficiency,
stability, and equality .in land use are of
prime importance as means to this end. Grant, too, that tenure arrangements play an important role in determining equality of access to land and its effective and stable use. Then,, if the end is to be achieved, attention is properly directed to the
study of the consequences of existing tenure furies to see whether they promote
or defeat the. realization of the end, and so aid the search for .tenure forms
which will be adequate and effective means.
This
conception of the scope and nature of land tenure
research, as will be seen, separates inquiry that validates ends from inquiry
that validates means. It is true that
the ends are taken or "assumed" to be desirable, as "objectives
inherent in our economic and political system.'' The point is that the outcome of inquiries
directed to the determination of the consequences of existing tenure forms is
conceived in such a fashion that the assumption will not and cannot be challenged.
What
is the basis, then, far the claim that the situation described as desirable as an end is really so? The standard is central try the appraisal that the report makes of the scope of land
tenure research studies. How was it come
by? By what special methods? What
assurance is given,, open to the test of others, that the ends- set up are
desirable, as is asserted? The significant point here is not that the authors fail to
ground-the judgment about the desirability of certain ends but that their
conception of ends is such as to require
for their appraisal a separate and distinct kind of inquiry from that which appraises means.
The
notion is implicit in the way the authors ,characterize what they denominate a
problematic situation. Speaking of
research in tenure; the first objective they say "is the determination of
the gap that exists between
the present situation
and the desired norm… i.
e., the delimitations
of the problematic
situation. (p. 6) Thus a problematic situation is defined as one in which there is
a noted discrepancy between what exists
and what is desirable. Inquiry is called for to determine the extent
of the discrepancy as well as to determine those existing factors which obstruct
and those which facilitate the achievement of the ideal. A notion of what is held to be desirable or ideal on
the one hand, an existent situation, on the other, and a procedure for
measuring the extent of the discrepancy -and so delimiting a
problematic situation is extremely dubious as an account of the rise of problems
and consequent inquiry. I doubt very
much that I can take my existing physiological and psychological conditions,
compare it with an ideal of health, determine the extent of the gap, and be
guided thereby to noting the existent factors which obstruct the realization of
the ideal.
Is
it not rather the case that we do not have occasion to inquire and hence have
no. problems unless our experience or activity is rendered indeterminate its.
some respect, not by departure from an ideal, but through the introduction of some factor that
interrupts the activity? So it happens
that a tooth becomes painful or falls out and interferes with the activity of eating. Stated generally there is an insufficiency, a
lack in the situation as experienced which generates inquiry or deliberation as to what is good or better to
do. The indeterminate situation gets
problematic determination as a stage in the deliberation process that ends in .a complete or sufficient
situation. A later stage in the deliberation process is one in which occurs
suggestions, ideas for solution of the problem so determined. In this .case, let us say I decide that I had
better see a dentist. What dentist? This is decided. And the dentist in his turn goes through a similar process in determining what had better be done or as sometimes
is the case, defining and limiting alternatives for the patient's final
decision.
The
genuine judgment as to what is desirable
is the outcome of an inquiry
which is instigated by an experienced lack or insufficiency in unique
situation. The lack of insufficiency, let us call it a gap or discrepancy, is not something
that is determined by comparing the existent with an ideal. It is a situation directly experienced. An idea or ideal occurs in
response to the situation as problematized and its
function is to symbolize possible ways of action, which when enacted, will render
the situation sufficient, complete. The
ideal formed is not, then; something that antecedes the existent situation with
which it can be compared and be found lacking or not. The ideal, the judgment of what is desirable;
is something that occurs in response to a situation as problematized
and has an instrumental office in transforming the indeterminate situation into
a determinate one.
The
notion that a problematic
situation grows out of a comparison of an existent condition with a norm or an ideal is
the outgrowth of the acceptance of a view that the desirability of ends as
ends can be established without a consideration of means. Having
determined what is desirable as an end at large and in general, independent of
inquiries in actual situations, we have a measure of the defects in existent situations. In fact what the position comes to is that the actual deliberations in which farm
operators engage are properly to be understood as being deliberations about
means to the attainment of ends whose desirability as ends is determined independent
of his deliberations. “Those to whom society has granted access to rights in land, either by overt action or by sanction, are under obligation to use this resource in such a manner as benefits other members the public.” (p.
5) (Italics mine). In the context where this sentence occurs it
is difficult-to see that it means anything other than that
efficiency and stability are desirable ends of land use. Let the user of agricultural resources accept
them. His actual decisions in the farm
operation are essentially problems of finding effective means thereto.
It
may be correctly maintained that there is an important sense in which a farm
operator or a public authority representing a
public interest can be said to
have his decisions directed by the acceptance of certain ends that are prior to and in some sense independent of
particular decisions about land use. In this sense
one may say that efficiency in resource use and stability of productivity
are--accepted as desirable ends. The point
must be made, however, that these are generalized concepts and. strictly
speaking are not aimed at as such. Their origins must be traced to activities engaged in by farms operators which,
having certain consequences that have been liked, have, then been
instituted as ways. of acting in new
situations sufficiently similar to
previous ones to be treated similarly. Extended
and generalized they become standardized ends.
It is a mistake, I believe, to think that they are aimed at as such, the
problem being simply to f
In a genuine problematic situation
of a farm operator where inquiry ensues and decision is reached as to what is better to do, the question is precisely what end to form, or better,
perhaps, what course of action should be performed to rectify the situation. In this determination an aim or end is clarified and the-generalized concepts of
efficiency and stability may play a part in: this clarification. What is reached as a consequence of deliberation is a clarified aim
which is not a means to efficiency and stability as ends but really a means to the resolution of the unique
problematic situation. This clarified
aim is acted upon and does or does not
resolve the problem. If upon careful
observation it is found to do so, it becomes available for the treatment of
situations sufficiently similar to the original one.
The
distinction here may seem to some to be a matter of minor importance. This is a
mistaken view, I believe. Take, for
example, a farm operator deciding what to do with a given acreage in the light
of the recent soil bank legislation. It
is difficult for me to see how such a person can be said properly to be
deliberating about means to ends that the authors declare to be desirable. In the first place he is clearly in the
position where it is proper to say he doesn't know what he really wants. He has a plethora of wants. What he-doesn't yet know is what is the
wantable want. It isn't that his ends
are clear and that all he seeks is means thereto. This. Is the very matter to be decided. In the second place; his decision is made
within a unique context. He may be
well off or poorly off. He may have a
large family or a small' one. He may
have a keen interest in conservation or no interest at all. And so on.
What enters into his deliberation about what is desirable to do is
shaped by this unique context and his final decision is a function of the
weight given to these factors as well as to efficiency and stability, if these
enter at all. In the third place, it is a
mistake to look at the various factors in-
land use as if there were only one or two or three consequences of these
factors which are of importance. Take
the tenure arrangement. Certainly it
is-abundantly clear that form of tenure has-important influence upon
use of resources. But is it true that
the only consequences worth noting are those- of efficiency, stability, and
equality of access? Are there not
collateral consequences of given forms of land tenure that have bearing upon
its appraisal as a factor in land use? What is the justification of singling out
from among the consequences only those mentioned? It cannot be denied that there are other consequences, however little we know about them. If we do single out certain consequences
and ignore the others, and they will
occur whether we like it or not, may we not came out with a poor reckoning indeed? How will we know, for example, whether the
collateral and unnoted consequences are not such as will defeat the ends which
we hold to be desirable?
If
what I contend is true, namely, that the
inquiry that undertakes to settle the
question of what is better to do is an inquiry that settles both means and end
within its, own context, certain further statements may be made. Assuming that the farm operator is the heart
of the agricultural enterprise in the sense that decisions about occupancy and use of land resources are to be left largely to him, the improvement
of his status involves the improvement of his decisions. And the improvement of his decisions involves
attention to the procedure of deliberation, on the one hand, and the provision of
dependable generalizations giving power of secure predictions, on the other.
A
farm operator whose tenure arrangement is a given form is aided in the
formation of his aims or ends, for example, if he possesses and uses well
warranted generalizations concerning the connection of that form with dissociation of costs and returns
and thus with the levels of efficiency, or between the given form and given credit
facilities and efficient operation. The
situation is comparable to one in which the ratio both in process of
manufacture and as a product is improved through-the use of scientific generalizations. But generalizations of such a kind; however
well established do not control the formation of ends unless they are used in
the deliberation process in which value judgments occur. Consequently attention is directed to the
incidence of habit and routine, prejudice and other factors which impede the
exercise of intelligence in the use of land resources.
The
decision about what is desirable to do in a given situation, though controlled
by the use of warranted generalization about the connections in existence, is
not itself warranted by them. Such
warrant as the value judgment may receive can only be derived by trying it out
and noting what
ensues. If what ensues upon actual enactment of the course
of action, is the resolution of the uniquely indeterminate situation which generated inquiry
(determined by careful observation of the consequences) we have the basis for a
norm when in such and
such a situation, it is desirable to do so and so.
The
proposal of norms in respect to tenure arrangements is; as I understand it, one
of the objectives of land tenure research.
What is contended here is that they will be established or warranted
only when the choice of a given tenure form is seen in its function of
resolving a given problematic situation. The choice of a given .form will be seen not
as a means to some generalized end determined to be such independent of the
situation in question. It will be seen
as a plan of action and thus a tool or instrument designed to bring about an
actual experienced situation having the quality of completeness or sufficiency which was lacking in the situation that
instigated the inquiry in the first instance.[1]
The
view has been expressed here that may be summarily stated. I believe the statement about the nature and
scope of research in land tenure prepared by the Interregional Land Tenure
Research Committee has implicit in it the view that inquiry directed to the
appraisal of things as means must be distinguished and separated from inquiry
directed to the appraisal of things as ends. The definition of the scope and nature of
tenure research is determined by this dualism of ends and means for it is
defined essentially as the search for tenure forms which will serve as effective means .for the
attainment of maxim-urn contribution to the satisfaction
of human wants.
An
examination of the deliberation process in which choices are made and value
judgments are formed, renders untenable such a dualism. A genuine judgment about what is better to do establishes an aim or an end-in-view which functions as a means in the
rectification of a problematic situation.
In the degree to which :measures are instituted to test whether or not this
function is performed,
the result is available for other situations of sufficient similarity. Problematic situations are not properly
defined as a noted discrepancy between what exists and a norm, ideal, or
situation whose origin and validity is determined apart from problematic
situations and their resolution. Rather a judgment about what is desirable has its origin in
response to a problematic situation, has its validation in its efficacy as a
tool for its rectification, and is hence available as a norm for situations
demonstrably similar.
The
bearing of this view upon the problem of defining the scope and nature of
research in land tenure is clear.
Whether or not a given tenure form is desirable is not something that is
determined by treating tenure arrangements as means to ends that are judged to
be desirable apart from particular problematic situations in which farm
operators make decisions. Rather what is
called for in making such a judgment is careful analysis of the particular context within which the judgment about the desirability of a given tenure
form is made and the consequences that ensue in respect to resolution of the
problems which required decision. If we
say that there is only one problem, namely„ how to achieve efficiency, stability, and
equality so far as tenure arrangements determine these ends,
we in effect ignore the actual contexts in which determination of ends is made. These actual contexts it would seem to me to be of prime importance if, as
is asserted, decisions about land allocation
and use are to be left, largely to the
individual.
[1] Explicit mention its made here of the decisions of the farm operator. Legislators and public administrators, of course, have an important place in establishing through their decisions a structure of conditions which determine the decisions of the farmer. But there is no significant difference insofar as analysis of value judgment is concerned.