For well over a decade computationalists have been responding to John Searle's Chinese Room
argument with varying success. My focus is one such reply recently presented by David Chalmers.
He claims that the Chinese Room argument only works against the traditional, symbolic form of
computationalism. He argues that subsymbolic computationalism is immune to the Chinese Room
dues to its distributed representational manner. This difference between the semantical
interpretations of the two computational variants is the crux of what saves subsymbolic
computationalism, according to Chalmers. However, I feel that Chalmers' argument, after some
clarifying, is on the right direction but still faulty. I offer a slight reworking of Chalmers' view that
retains his original intentions, but is able to circumvent the Chinese Room's influence.
Few single arguments in the philosophy of mind are as enduring and discussed as John Searle's
Chinese Room (1980). Perhaps one of the reasons for this continuing influence is its strong claims.
Searle believes that he refutes the entire artificial intelligence endeavor; that no computer program of
any sort could ever become a mind. Artificial intelligence studies are only useful as a mere tool for
better understanding our minds and nothing more. These bold claims have sparked much debate,
especially from among the computationalists, who stand in complete opposition to Searle's view.
One recent objection by David Chalmers (1992) is particularly interesting, in my opinion. He
believes that the Chinese Room argument is not as all-encompassing as Searle claims. Chalmers
makes a distinction between symbolic and subsymbolic computationalism (explained in section 4) and
argues that this distinction is very relevant to the issue. Through some of its special characteristics,
Chalmers believes that subsymbolic computationalism can avoid the Chinese Room argument.
Instead of arguing that subsymbolic computationalism definitely does have meaning and explaining
exactly how it might do so, he merely claims that it can avoid one particular argument (albeit a
powerful and popular argument) and therefore create the possibility that this form of computationalism
may have meaning.
I feel that Chalmers' argument does raise a strong objection against the Chinese Room.
However, there are problems with the direction in which Chalmers carries his objection. With some
minor modifications, I feel that his objection becomes quite a powerful crack in the Chinese Room's
influence. Perhaps Searle's arguments are not as overwhelming and encompassing as he might like to
think. I will start off by outlining Searle's original Chinese Room argument and then clarify some of
it's ambiguous terminology. Then after laying out the two computationalist positions, I will present a
clarified version of the Chinese Room. I will then present how the clarified Chinese Room applies to
symbolic computationalism, and then Chalmers' position on how it applies to subsymbolic
computationalism. Then I will point out where Chalmers runs into trouble. Lastly, I will proceed to
rework Chalmers' argument that does seem to refute the Chinese Room's argument against
Subsymbolic Computationalism.
Searle's original thought experiment of the Chinese Room argument was rich with intuitions,
however Searle has often been criticized for just how intuitional the argument is. Daniel Dennet has
even gone so far as to saying that these intuitions "are defective; they do not enhance but mislead
our imaginations" (Dennet p. 440, 1991). Searle has also presented a variation of it in a more
clearly stated form which is much easier to discuss. This restatement is in the form of three axioms
and his conclusion (Searle 1984, p. 39).
I will clarify these terms and develop a finer-tuned argument in just a moment. First, let's take
a quick look at those intuitions, which will help us to get a general understanding of the argument
before we get into the nitty-gritty details. Searle is basically saying that computer programs operate
only by rules that are syntactic, and that syntactic rules are unable to endow those symbols with
meaning. In other words, computer programs are simply a collection of rules where any meaning that
the variables (the computers' symbols) may or may not have do not matter in the least to the program.
It just computes away on these variables that could mean anything, or nothing at all. For example, a
computer program may involve the variable ELEPHANT, but all
that the program is concerned with is a binary string of 1's and 0's. We, the programmers, are the
ones who decide that it corresponds to the concept elephant. Since there are no other
avenues open for computer programs that Searle sees as relevant, they cannot have any meaning. This
is a very simple overview of the Chinese Room argument, but should at least get us thinking in the
general direction Searle wants us to.
So now that we have laid out the basis of Searle's argument, let's dive in and clear up some of
the wording. The term computational system deserves some clarification. What exactly does separate
one system from another? I feel that a good definition of a computational system is a series or group of
processes that follow a given set of rules. This leads to the characteristics of a particular system being
defined by the rules that govern it. So now the characteristics of the rules themselves become integral
to the nature of the system as a whole.
The idea of computational tokens are often misinterpreted, as well. First off, a token of any sort
is the thing that the rules operate over. Roughly, grammatical rules operate over words, and
mathematical rules operate over numbers. Computational tokens are the base objects that the
computer program uses to compute. They are the base variables and/or nodes of the program or
network. What they physically are depends on the particular computer model used to instantiate
them, but for philosophical purposes they are the basic things that the rules use and operate by.
I wish to clarify tokens just a step further. The term is used sometimes to refer to only the
meaningless objects that the rules operate over, and sometimes as objects that may or may not have
meaning. Within this paper, I will refer to the meaningless objects or aspects of objects as tokens and
the (potentially) meaningful objects or aspects of objects as representations. In other words, the
computational rules operate over tokens which may or may not be representations, depending on what
kind of computationalist you are.
Searle relies heavily upon the language of syntax and semantics. These terms are quite vague,
even in their native discipline of linguistics. When specifically defined, they do become a useful
shorthand as Searle uses them. The only problem is that Searle does not specifically define them.
Syntax, concerning this issue, refers to any rules that operate with no reference to the (internal)
meaning of its tokens. They operate using the tokens as meaningless objects, just as the grammar of a
language is not specific about the meaning of the words.
Semantics is the meaning that Searle is searching for. Searle regards the presence of meaning
as a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a mind. However, meaning can pop up in
many guises. The one Searle uses is internal meaning. This is the meaning that is inherent to the
system. It is self-evident without any outside influence whatsoever. More meaning may or may not
arise from that outside influence, but it is all grounded in the internal meaning of the system. This is
to be distinguished from external meaning which is created solely by outside forces, interpretive
meaning which does bring the system itself into the picture but is still dependant upon outside forces,
and original meaning that is built into the system from the start.1
Now that we have the terminology cleared up, let's clarify Searle's main target, or targets as the
case may be. Computationalism is the theory that a purely computational system can give rise to a
mind. In other words, a mind can be captured algorithmically in a computer program and instantiating
that program or class of programs is enough to create or be a mind. Not all computationalists agree on
how this occurs. Recently they have split into two major camps.
Symbolic computationalism is the traditional version. In it the base computational tokens are
also the base objects of semantic interpretation. The tokens are thus representations. The
fundamental objects that the system computes with are alleged to contain the meaning for the system
as well. So if a system as a whole was currently representing dog, then each individual
token would represent, say, a particular feature of a dog. There would be a 4 legs token, a
cold, wet nose token and so forth. Each of these tokens would directly refer to and
represent a feature of the dog (This gets a bit clearer in contrast to subsymbolic computationalism
below). This is the dominant form of computationalism, but a new arrival is gaining quite a following
of its own.
Subsymbolic computationalism is inspired by the connectionist movement in computer science
(Rumelhart, McClelland, & the PDP Research Group 1986). Subsymbolic computationalism
splits levels and has its lowest level of semantic interpretation above the level of computation. As
Chalmers explains it, the base computations take place at one level and in some manner blend together
to give rise to meaning at a higher level. As he states the symbolic/subsymbolic distinction (Chalmers
1992, p.34):
The representations are distributed over a set of computational tokens, rather than there being a
one to one relation between them. The entire network, or at least a significant portion of it, is the
representation. Furthermore, depending upon the network's pattern of activation, it can be any of a
number of representations. This type of non-atomic, distributed representation is a feature unique,
and quite important, to subsymbolic computationalism (Hinton, McClelland, Rumelhart 1986). To
continue the dog example, if a subsymbolic computational system is currently representing
dog, each token would not represent a feature of a dog, as they would with a type of
symbolic computational system. In fact, each token would not refer directly to anything at all and
would consequently have no meaning. The only meaning is in the entire system's particular state of
activation, in this case dog. Alter any single token and the representation of the entire
system will change. Even though each token plays a causal role in the distributed representation, none
of them carry any semantic burden. All that they do is crunch and gurgle the information in a
particular way so that the system as a whole can have meaning.
Subsymbolic computationalism may have stemmed from connectionism, but there are indeed
very significant differences. Connectionism is best seen as a computer science style of computing and
subsymbolic computationalism as the philosophical theory. Connectionist machines stand in contrast
to Von Nuemann computers (the standard for nearly all computers since the 1940's), but
connectionist computation can be implemented as a symbolic rather than subsymbolic system. It is
solely dependant on whether or not the base computational tokens are also the objects of semantic
interpretation. The interconnection based system may lend itself more easily to the subsymbolic style
of computationalism, but neither is necessary for the other.
The fundamental and most relevant difference between the two forms of computation concerns
the minimum level of semantic interpretation. It is either at the level of base computation or higher.
Even higher levels of meaning are definitely possible (if any are) in both systems. In most variations,
though, any higher meaning is dependant in some way on the presence of the lowest level of meaning.
Consequently, it is this lowest level of semantic interpretation that I will be concerned with.
So far we almost have the entire groundwork for this issue laid out. We have a general
understanding of Searle's argument, a clearly defined set of terminology, as well as the opposing views
explained. The last thing that remains is to get a clear understanding of the Chinese Room that we
can deal with and not concern ourselves with intuitions and thought experiments. I will restate
Searle's argument with the terminology I laid out. Hopefully, this is merely a fine-tuning of the
argument that remains true to Searle's intentions.
A reliable test to see if rules do, indeed, operate without reference to content, is to see whether
tokens are interchangeable without violating the rules or reworking the system. To continue the
analogy with language, English grammar is a set of rules that operate with no reference to content.
They merely look at the part of speech of the word and not its meaning. This can be shown be
interchangeablity. The sentence "The pills killed the virus." can be changed to
"The pills killed the Vice President." and "The pills killed themselves."
without violating any grammar rules. Grammatically, meaning does not matter in the least.
The rules of English semantics is another matter. Going back to the three lethal pill sentences,
the first two are semantically correct though with greatly different meanings, whereas the third violates
the rules of semantics. There is something intrinsic to the concept of pills that prevents them from
killing themselves. The words are not interchangeable. Semantic rules do operate with reference to
the internal structure and relations of the words.
For the computational systems, interchangeability shows whether the tokens operate under rules
that have reference to their internal content or not. If the rules operate with no reference to the
tokens' contents, then they are taken and used as faceless wholes; any meaning or internal structure
that it may possess is irrelevant. The meaning of a particular token could be switched with another
and the rules would function just fine and dandy. Returning to the dog example, we could decide that
the token for cold, wet nose would instead mean 4 legs and the system would
compute just fine. They are just labels for the tokens and there is nothing intrinsic in the tokens
themselves that force them to represent one thing instead of another.
Now that we have cleared up Searle's argument and the two main views he is attacking, I will
look at how the two forms of computationalism stand up to the Chinese Room. Searle uses his
argument rather effectively against symbolic computationalism. In fact, it is apparent that Searle had
symbolic computationalism in mind when he formulated the Chinese Room. The objects of minimum
semantic interpretation are also the base tokens of computation. Due to their atomic nature, the
tokens are interchangeable. For example, a particular variable could mean anything and the system
would function normally. The rules would compute over it exactly the same manner no matter what.
This follows Searle's argument exactly. The process of computing over these tokens has no
regard to their content, and therefore cannot give them content. Since the rules are unable to give
those objects internal meaning, there is no other alternative or alternative sources for meaning to arise
in the system itself.
Some symbolic computationalists have tried to find ways of refuting this argument, but that will
not be my concern here. Basically, symbolic computationalism walks directly into Searle's argument.
What about subsymbolic computationalism? With subsymbolic computationalism, Searle
would most likely feel that since it is computational also, then it must follow the same argument the
same way. Chalmers thinks differently. He believes that the differences between symbolic and
subsymbolic computationalism are significant enough to warrant consideration. He also believes that
these differences indeed set subsymbolic computationalism apart from symbolic computationalism
when dealing with the Chinese Room.
At the lowest level of computation, the rules operate without any reference to the content of the
tokens, just as with the symbolic computationalism. The system is still computational. However, the
subsymbolic computationalist does not claim that meaning exists at this level. The splitting of levels is
the key to meaning in this system.
At the minimal level of semantic interpretation, which is above the level of computation, the
tokens now have a rich internal structure made up of the base computational tokens due to their
distributed representational and therefore non-atomic nature. Whereas the computational tokens may
be interchangeable, tokens at this level of semantic interpretation have an internal structure that does
not allow them to be interchanged. The internal structure of these representations are relevant simply
due to the fact that they overlap. Interchanging two tokens would alter the internal structure of a third
one. Therefore, at this level the system does operate by rules that have reference to the content of its
tokens. This, Chalmers believes, refutes the Chinese Room argument.
So where exactly does Chalmers think Searle goes wrong. Chalmers believes that Searle's first
axiom (Syntax is not sufficient for semantics) is simply false. As an example, he brings up the human
brain.
Now that I have laid out Chalmers' view, in true philosophical fashion, let's see what is wrong
with it. I agree with Chalmers in that the non-interchangeability of subsymbolic computationalism
shows that it is immune to the Chinese Room argument, and therefore somewhere Searle is wrong.
Where I depart from Chalmers is on where Searle's error occurs. For starters, what Chalmers is
proposing is a reworking of what is meant by syntax and semantics. He is saying the syntax is indeed
sufficient for semantics, but merely at a higher level. It may not be that simple though to completely
alter our notion of these concepts that quickly and easily. This revisionary position rests on his analogy
to the human brain. Herein lies Chalmers' problem.
He compares the manner in which the human brain is governed by the laws of physics to the
manner in which a computer program follows a set algorithm. Are these two actually equivalent? I do
not believe so. These are two fundamentally different types of processes. The laws of physics are far
different from the syntactic rules that make up computer program algorithms. The computer program
rules fit into the linguistic explanatory framework, they can be clearly understood as syntactic, or even
potentially semantic. However, it is quite a stretch to attempt to fit the laws of physics into that kind
of linguistic framework. This "rule following"/"law governed" distinction is a
rather fine one, but clearly applicable in this instance.
Another possibility that Chalmers briefly touches on is to use the human brain example again
except not quite at the molecular level. It could still be possible to look at the human brain as a purely
syntactic system on the neural level. The behavior of all the brain's neurons could be explained with
rules that lack reference to any internal content. Hence the brain is a purely syntactic system at the
neural level (rather than molecular level). The problem here is that this presupposes
computationalism. Even though most debate is about the rules that concepts operate by, whether or
not the brain operates by purely syntactic rules at the neural level is also still in dispute. Searle could
simply fail to agree that the neural level operates by syntax alone. Since this matter is still in
contention, it is consequently not a viable option for Chalmers. Perhaps there is actually another
direction to carry Chalmers' objection.
Let's take a moment to catch our breath. So far I have cleared up Searle's Chinese Room
argument, and then looked at how each of the forms of computationalism stand up against it.
Symbolic computationalism appears to walk right into Searle's hands. Chalmers attempts to prove
that subsymbolic computationalism, due to its distributed representational nature, has non-interchangeable tokens and is therefore immune to the Chinese Room. However, Chalmers' attempt
to show where Searle goes wrong falls short. Now, I will put forth where I believe that Searle goes
wrong and how Chalmers' objection best applies.
Can a system that follows rules that have no reference to the meaning of their tokens endow
itself with meaning? If a system is defined entirely by those rules alone, as Searle's third axiom
claims, then it cannot. A system that is entirely syntactical cannot, by definition, have semantics.
Syntax is a matter of rules that have no reference to meaning, and since the system has the
characteristics of the rules, then the system has no meaning. In other words, syntax simply is rules
without semantics, and so a system that is entirely syntactical is entirely without semantics.
Does splitting levels actually help bring about the possibility of meaning? Actually, it does
indeed help subsymbolic computationalism circumvent the Chinese Room argument. It does not,
however, provide a solid base for having syntax create semantics at higher levels. It may or may not be
true, but I do not feel that Chalmers provides enough support to alter people's notion of syntax and
semantics. That has the potential of being a very large argument in itself. A stronger and more
appropriate path, in my opinion, is to apply Chalmers' basic objection to the third rather than first
axiom:
Are computational systems entirely defined this way? For any system in general, it is more
appropriate to look at the minimal level of what you are looking for. If you were looking to see how it
computed, you would look at the base level of computation. If you were looking for meaning, you should
look at the minimal level of semantic interpretation, and not necessarily at the base level of
computation. If the two levels are separate, as they are in subsymbolic computationalism, then one
should look at the minimal level of what you are looking for and not lower. Looking any lower than
what is claimed would be irrelevant.
Searle commits this error in the case of subsymbolic computationalism. Its supporters claim to
have (or to have at least the possibility of) meaning at a level higher than the level of computation.
Searle then looks to the level of computation and, finding no meaning, claims that there is not any in
the entire system.
However, this notion of having computational and representational levels is rather difficult to
discern. I believe that it is better said that the system is functionally two separate systems. Going
back to my definition of a computational system, we find that the two different levels operate under
different sets of rules. The computational level uses rules that do not have reference to the content of
its tokens, whereas the semantic interpretation level follows rules that do have reference to the tokens'
content, as Chalmers stated. This would differentiate them functionally as two separate systems.
With two systems, the computation-only system falls to the Chinese Room. This is not a
problem since no subsymbolic computationalist ever claimed meaning there. The semantic
interpretation level, however, is resistant to Searle's argument. It operates by rules that do have
reference to content and therefore can have meaning.
These two systems are not entirely independent of each other. I mentioned that they are
functionally two separate systems, because they are really two different perspectives on one physical
"thing". It is one physical system, but functionally two separate systems. You can look at
the initial system as either a syntactic or semantic one as long as it has the proper layout as a
subsymbolic computational system.
Since we are now dealing with one "thing" that is actually two separate systems, it
would seem that a new concept is in order. Perhaps it is best to consider these to be computational
entities. A computational entity is a physical "thing" that is fundamentally implemented
by a computational system. With these computational entities, we could construct it by rules that have
no reference to the internal content of their tokens in the proper way so that a second system is created
within the same entity that operates by rules that do indeed have reference to the internal content of
their tokens.2
Simply put, under my view, talking only about different systems can get quite confusing quickly.
One entity could instantiate several different systems. With the subsymbolic computational entities,
we are only considering the base level of computation and the level of semantic interpretation. Other
examples of entities instantiating multiple systems include our classic language analogy. A human
language can be seen as one entity that has various systems with independent rules, namely phonetics,
grammar, word meaning, and sentence meaning. So now my restatement of the third axiom and
conclusion are:
Some computationalists may not agree with this version though. The objection has been raised
that this may no longer be computational. I believe that it is still within the bounds of
computationalism, and is just not as extreme as the other views.
The meaning itself is not directly captured algorithmically, it is captured indirectly though. A
physical system can have meaning if and only if it has a certain layout when viewed computationally.
If it has a different computational layout, then the physical system will lack internal meaning no
matter how viewed. The system of semantic interpretation and the system of base computation
function independently of each other by different sets of rules but their existence is still intimately
connected. By looking for a computational entity with possible multiple systems, rather than a single
computational systems, I believe we stand a much better chance of arguing against views such as
Searle's. I feel this is enough for it to be considered computationalism and at least in support of
Artificial Intelligence research.
We have seen that Searle's Chinese Room argument (when properly clarified) presents quite a
problem to symbolic computationalism. However, Chalmers shows that the Chinese Room does not
deal with subsymbolic computationalism in the same manner.
At first he tries to prove that by having the level of computation below the level of semantic
interpretation, it is possible for the lower syntax to create higher level semantics. This view, however,
attempts to alter our concepts of syntax and semantics on the basis of the brain being a syntactic
system at the molecular level but still possessing internal meaning. This ignores the distinction
between being governed by the laws of physics and following algorithmic rules.
An alternative is to view the one physical system from two separate perspectives, making it
functionally two separate systems. This perspective shift is relevant to subsymbolic computationalism
due to the internal structure of the distributed representations. Therefore, subsymbolic
computationalism is able to circumvent the Chinese Room argument.
In certain cases, a base computational system can now be seen as more than just a collection of
rules with no reference to meaning. It is reasonable to look at the entire entity instantiating the
computational system from a higher perspective where meaning is possible. At the very least, the
Chinese Room does not prevent meaning from occurring in all computational entities.
Chalmers, D."Subsymbolic Computation and the Chinese Room," Symbolic
and Connectionist Paradigms: Closing the Gap. Hillsdale: L. Erlbaum Associates, 1992.
Dennet, D. Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1991.
Hinton, G., McClelland, J., & Rumelhart, D. "Distributed
Representations," Parallel Distributed Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of
Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
Rumelhart, D., McClelland, J., & the PDP Research Group. Parallel Distributed
Processing: Explorations in the Microstructure of Cognition. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1986.
Searle, J. "Minds, Brains, and Programs," The Behavioral and Brain
Sciences, 3, 1980.
Searle, J. Minds, Brains, and Science. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1984.
1. Introduction
2. The Chinese Room
1) Syntax is not sufficient for semantics.
However, even this reformulation relies on intuition, although to a lesser degree than before.
This is mostly through the wording that he uses. Searle states his argument in very simple terms.
With the complexity and fine distinctions in this area, though, simple terms are not good enough.
2) Minds have content, specifically, they have semantic content.
3) Computer programs are entirely defined by their formal syntactical structure.
Conclusion: Instantiating a program by itself is never sufficient for having a mind.
3. Terminology
4. Symbolic v. Subsymbolic Computationalism
In a symbolic system, the objects of computation are also the objects of semantic interpretation.
In a subsymbolic system, the objects of computation are more fine-grained than the objects of semantic
interpretation.
5. Clarifying the Chinese Room
1) Manipulation of tokens by rules that have no reference to the content of those tokens in
and of itself is not enough to endow the system with internal meaning.
Basically, if the objects of semantic interpretation operate under rules that have no reference to
their content, then they necessarily cannot have content.
2) Minds have internal meaning.
3) Computational systems are entirely defined by rules that have no reference to the content
of their tokens.
Conclusion: Computational systems alone are not sufficient to have or create internal meaning,
and therefore, a mind.
6. The Chinese Room and Symbolic Computationalism
7. The Chinese Room and Subsymbolic Computationalism
On the highest level, the human mind seems extremely flexible, producing the very antithesis of
rule-following behavior; yet at the bottom level, it is made up of a physical substrate, consisting of such
entities as elementary particles and electric charges, whose actions are determined by the laws of
physics (Chalmers 1992, p.39).
In other words, the human brain follows the rules of physics which are merely syntactic rules.
Since the brain has internal meaning (if anything does), then the axiom that syntax is not sufficient
for semantics is false. In the case of the human brain, it clearly is possible. Chalmers takes this to
mean that syntax can be, in fact, sufficient for semantics, only at a higher level. His reformulation of
Searle's first axiom would be:
1' Manipulation of tokens by rules that have no
reference to content in and of itself is not
enough to endow these tokens (not the system)
with internal meaning.
Chalmers finds that this reworking still has the same force against symbolic computationalism,
but not against subsymbolic computationalism. After letting the subsymbolic variation slip through, it
actually seems to form a stronger argument by aptly compensating for Chalmers' objection.
Concl' Computational systems alone are not sufficient to endow the computational tokens with
internal meaning.
8. Where Chalmers Goes Wrong
9. Reworking the Subsymbolic Computational Reply
3) Computational systems are entirely defined by rules that have no
reference to the content of their tokens.
3' Computational systems are entirely defined by rules that have no
reference to the content of their tokens; however, a computational system
may be only one of a multiple number of systems within a single
computational entity.
Concl' The computational systems instantiated within a computational entity are not
sufficient to have or create internal meaning and therefore a mind within
those computational systems.
10. Is this Still Computationalism?
11. Conclusion
Bibliography
Footnotes
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