Back to Working PapersABSTRACT
This paper explores situation, structure, and performance of deer management in two southern Wisconsin counties. Deer management is viewed as a common-pool-resource problem. The perception of interested parties (mainly hunters) that deer herds are too large and large bucks are too few relative to the number of total deer led to the formation of the Quality Deer Management Association. Quality Deer Management allows for flexibility (encouragement and persuasion rather than regulation) in achieving the desired performance outcome. The structural options of changes in Department of Natural Resources (DNR) hunting regulations in order to achieve the performance of a more balanced deer herd and smaller size of deer herds are rejected by many hunters who do not want stricter regulations. Improvements in the number of larger bucks have been observed, but the number of deer is estimated to reach record levels throughout the State of Wisconsin.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper uses the Situation-Structure-Performance (SSP) framework. (Schmid 1987) It is applied to the problem of deer herd management in Southern Wisconsin (primarily Dane and Iowa Counties). Approximately five years ago the Quality Deer Management Association formed in Southern Wisconsin in order to influence people's behavior toward deer harvesting. The Association is the result of very modest beginnings in quality deer management. A family in Dane County, Wisconsin, The Sutter's, and relatives began the shift in hunting behavior by passing up one-and-a-half year old bucks in order to try and have some of them grow up to become mature bucks. The Sutter's perceived the deer herds to be too large and the buck-doe ratio to be too low, especially with respect to larger bucks. A meeting was organized to which neighbors were invited. The Sutter's told their neighbors that they had been passing up small bucks and that the neighbors could be assured that if they did the same, and those smaller bucks were to cross over onto Sutter's land, the bucks would not be shot by anyone hunting on their property. The neighbors' response was unexpectedly generally positive. (Sutter 1995b)
This paper investigates how situation and structure, in terms of a base scenario and the alternative of Quality Deer Management, affect performance and how the same desired performance could perhaps be achieved by a different structure. This paper does not investigate other alternative structures which would lead to different performances.
The paper starts out by explaining the situation on which this case is based. Part B introduces structure, first the case as it existed before the Quality Deer Management Association was formed is described, Department of Natural Resources (DNR) management and regulation, then the Quality Deer Management Association is described, its structure, goals and means to achieve those goals. The performance under the different structures is analyzed for each case. Following are alternative structures which would possibly lead to the same performance. An important element in SSP analysis is the question whose preferences count. This is dealt with separately to highlight the importance of this element and to clarify the issues. The paper ends with summary and conclusion of the analysis.
II. DEER MANAGEMENT
A. SITUATION
In terms of the SSP framework, the good in question is the deer herd. The deer herd has a joint-impact-good quality in so far as the harvesting of one deer has marginal cost (MC) of zero (or very low MC) over some range as it does not significantly affect the harvesting of deer by another person. The deer herd is also a high-exclusion-cost good because relative to the benefits, fencing good enough to contain deer is very expensive and in order to offer a diverse, natural environment for the deer (open grassy areas for feeding, back-up cover, bedding areas, all of which need to be large enough to avoid degradation) a very large area would need to be fenced. Property lines do not follow deer habitat requirements and jointness of impact arises because deer require diverse habitat and move about in partly predictable and partly random patterns. In terms of deer viewing MC is zero because the deer viewing by one individual does not impact on deer viewing by another person. However, harvesting of a particular deer means that same deer cannot be taken by another person. For individual units incompatibility exists, the individual deer is an incompatible-use good for hunting (not viewing).
Because of the herd/individual deer distinction the case is more appropriately conceptualized as a common-pool resource.(Ostrom 1990). Ostrom (1990) refers to common pool resources as resource systems of a size which make it costly (though not impossible) to exclude people from deriving benefits from its use. Since the resource system is large, individual management efforts will have a negligible effect on the resource unless enough individuals coordinate their efforts to reach a threshold level. A deer herd can be regarded as such a resource system. An individual harvesting a deer will have no significant effect on another individual's harvesting opportunities. But the reverse holds true, too. For example, foregoing an individual buck has no perceptible effect on the buck-doe ratio. The individual has no incentive to engage in management efforts since individual effects are zero. Unless a threshold level of individuals engage in coordinated management, no significant benefits will be derived from their activities.
Ostrom's example of fishing grounds as common pool resources (CPRs) is most similar to the deer herd case studied here. Both types of resources are non-stationary in the sense that the fish and deer move about and are high exclusion cost goods since it would be prohibitive to try and contain the resource and prevent its use. Coordinated management by a minimum number of individuals are necessary to affect the resource. Without concerted individual efforts over-harvesting results as the benefit to individual restraint is negligible. The difference between the fishing and deer hunting cases is that fishers are interested in volume, compositions plays a less significant role, while hunters primarily care about the composition of the deer herd.
B. STRUCTURE AND PERFORMANCE
1) DNR Regulations and Management
The property rights to the deer population in question belong to the State of Wisconsin. The Department of Natural Resources (DNR) manages the deer herd by habitat management (on public land only) and issuance of deer hunting regulations (DNR 1994). Hunting licenses are sold, limiting the number and gender of deer which can be taken as well as the time of year during which hunting of deer is permitted. The hunting regulations also specify the type of weapon which may be used and when (i.e. bow hunting season, rifle/shotgun hunting season, and muzzle loader hunting season) and whether baiting and the use of tree stands are allowed.
I will limit my analysis to the rifle hunting season. Rifle hunting is the predominant form of deer hunting in Wisconsin, most hunters use a rifle and most deer are shot with a rifle. Rifle hunting is also the most efficient form of deer hunting when measured in numbers of deer taken per hunter. The DNR issues deer permits (hunting licenses) to the general public which allow the taking of male deer only. Hunters can apply for antlerless deer (does and fawns) permits, a Hunter's Choice Permit converts the regular deer tag into an any-deer tag and a bonus permit allows the taking of an additional (antlerless) deer. (Wallenfang 1995) Most of the land in Dane and Iowa Counties is privately owned (more than 90% according to Wallenfang 1995) and I will focus on this case.
Over the years a hunting "ethic" evolved which kept hunters from shooting does. Bucks were the preferred target for several reasons: 1. Bucks carry antlers and the bigger the antlers the more prestigious the kill, 2. Does would have offspring in the future and would thus contribute to an increase in the deer herd (a desired goal in the past), 3. Shooting a fawn is like killing "Bambi".
The basic scenario involves the situation, the common pool resource (deer herd), with a given structure, DNR and private habitat management under the current property rights structure, DNR deer hunting regulations (DNR 1994) as described, and a widely shared hunting "ethic" of not shooting does and fawns. Over the years performance characteristics of a certain age structure and size of deer herds have developed. There are currently few mature bucks, many does, fawns, and smaller bucks, and the deer herd is generally large. Most hunters are primarily interested in trophy hunting which means that mostly bucks are shot during deer season. However, large bucks take time to grow and therefore there are fewer large bucks than small bucks. Large bucks are also are more difficult to hunt because they are more wary than young bucks. A small buck is still more prestigious than a doe or fawn and hunters are inclined to shoot a small buck rather than an antlerless deer or none at all, especially since a small buck forgone by the individual may not be spared by another hunter. It is this dilemma that an individual hunter cannot be sure that forgoing small bucks will mean that there will be more larger bucks in the future which together with the other situational and structural characteristics has led to the current performance of an unbalanced deer herd. Currently only few large(r) bucks are sighted and most of the deer taken during hunting season are small bucks. (Wallenfang 1995) Even though multiple bonus permits (up to six in some areas) can be applied for, on average only one bonus permit is obtained in addition to the buck tag (Wallenfang 1995). According to Wallenfang (1995) most hunters are trophy hunters and are not particularly interested in deer hunting for meat.
2. The Quality Deer Management Association
Deer management can be characterized by a multi-person prisoner's dilemma (MPD). Schelling's (1978) definition of MPD reflects the fact that some threshold number of people foregoing small bucks is necessary in order for these individuals to be better off than if everyone continued to shoot small bucks. The threshold establishes the minimum size coalition necessary to significantly affect the composition of the deer herd. Members of the coalition will gain, however, free-riders will gain even more from coalition efforts since they do not have to incur the costs of organizing and foregoing small bucks. The problem in forming this coalition is that the individual hunter faces incentives which lead to outcomes that do not correspond to the desired outcomes of most individuals. The dilemma can be addressed in
different ways, a) central mandate, b) reciprocal altruism (tit-for-tat),
c) mutual coercion mutually agreed upon, and d)
socially instilled conscience (Dawes et al. 1990). The Quality Deer Management Association tries to address the social dilemma of deer management by trying to affect the social conscience and perhaps an element of reciprocal altruism. To add to an already complex problem, it is possible that a coalition can change payoffs associated with the alternative actions. A minimum coalition of deer hunters will affect the age composition of the deer herd. More larger bucks will be sighted. Since most hunters are trophy hunters, knowledge of large bucks in the area will lead hunters to wait for a large buck. This increases the likelihood that small bucks will not be shot. Hunters are more likely to shoot small bucks when they know that there is little chance of a larger one coming their way because no large bucks have been sighted before or during deer season.
The local Quality Deer Management Association was formed about 5 years ago in the Dane County area due to the initiative of individuals who are interested in a quality deer herd. A quality deer herd is considered to be characterized by a balanced mix of different age groups. The classic prisoner's dilemma outcome is a suboptimal one. This results from the fact that simultaneous play is assumed. The optimal outcome in the deer management case is that of at least a threshold number of people not shooting small bucks. In order for a minimum coalition to form the required minimum number of people have to make a commitment not to shoot small bucks and stick to it. This commitment problem has been tackled by the individuals involved in Quality Deer Management in a step-by-step fashion. Initially the commitment was made to family and relatives only. Gradually it spread to neighbors and from neighbor to neighbor. The Quality Deer Management association was formed and more formal channels (e.g. newsletters) for spreading the ideas beyond neighborhoods have been established. (Sutter 1995b) Credible commitments are not possible without monitoring. If no one knows whether other individuals keep their commitments or not, there is no incentive for the individual to keep the commitment since payoffs from deviating are high. Monitoring is not a serious problem in the case discussed here since hunters derive significant benefits from showing off their "trophies" (see also discussion on monitoring below).
Currently, the Association has no formal structure (no Constitution with formal membership rules and funding structure). A basic "members" list is kept of people who organize and attend local meetings. Persuasive power is used to try and convince people to adhere to the basic principles the group promotes. The group accepts donations but no membership fees are collected. According to one of the founders of the Quality Deer Management Association, Greer Sutter, the goals of the group include: the enhancement of the overall health and quality of the deer herd to benefit all patrons. The Quality Deer Management Association proposes to superimpose a new structure onto the existing structure by replacing the "don't shoot does" ethic by a "don't shoot small bucks" ethic in addition to existing DNR regulations. A more formal structure for official members is currently being debated.
A more balanced and reduced deer herd is to be obtained by passing up smaller bucks (antler spread no more than inside ear tips), and the bagging of more does to reduce the overall deer herd. By allowing the smaller bucks to grow up, the age mix of the herd will improve toward larger numbers of older male deer. The probability of seeing and harvesting a larger buck will increase. Smaller deer herds will alleviate pressure on the habitat, reduce crop damage, allow regeneration of wood lots and put less pressure on rare plants. Many of the individuals currently subscribing to quality deer management are hunters but those enjoying deer for aesthetic reasons may also join the group as they prefer a more "natural" deer herd. Many people enjoy seeing big bucks, hunters and non-hunters alike. The Quality Deer Management Association also attaches importance to cooperation with the DNR and local landowners.
Because of the close ties of deer to the land, property rights to land become very important. A structural feature in the deer herd case is the fact that most of the land is privately held (the deer on the land, however, are public property).
In "Governing the Commons", Elinor Ostrom tentatively establishes seven rules for enduring self-organized groups. The rules are:
1. Clearly defined boundaries.
2. Congruence between appropriation and provision rules and local
conditions.
3. Collective choice arrangements.
4. Monitoring.
5. Graduated sanctions.
6. Conflict-resolution mechanism.
7. Minimal recognition of rights to organize.
An eighth rule for CPRs as parts of larger systems:
8. Nested enterprises.
(Ostrom, 1990)
Landowners can enroll their land in the Quality Deer Management Association and individuals can become members by subscribing to the principles of the Association. Individual members may hunt on their own land, land owned by another private property holder, or on public land. Definition of boundary refers to boundary of the resource and specification of individuals who (potentially) use the resource (appropriators). The resource boundary could be a particular deer herd habitat or the geographic area in which the Quality Deer Management Association is active (e.g. county, regional level). (Potential) appropriators are deer hunters and in a broader sense deer viewers as well. I will focus on hunters. Appropriation rights on public land extend to anyone who has a valid deer license and abides by deer hunting regulations. The number is potentially very large. Most of the land in Dane and Iowa County is private, however, and appropriation rights are more limited. Landowners and anyone who has landowner permission in addition to meeting the requirements for appropriation on public land have appropriation rights. It makes sense in the context of the Quality Deer Management Association to define the geographic boundary as extending to the area where the local association is active. This is Dane and Iowa Counties. The term "legal appropriators" should be limited to those who subscribe to the Association principles in addition to meeting the aforementioned criteria. In this setting, the potential for "outsiders" to benefit from efforts of Association members is very large. The deer herds cannot be confined to land which is enrolled in the Association and non-subscribing hunters can benefit from members passing up younger bucks by having a higher probability to shoot younger and older bucks. Trespass may occur and "outsiders" may thus illegally benefit from quality management practices. Exclusion on public land is not possible when DNR requirements are met.
Requirement 2 refers to appropriation rules which in this case focus on not shooting small bucks (antlers not extending beyond ear tips) and taking more does to reduce herd size. Provision rules could include deer habitat management in order to sustain the deer population but it does not appear to be an issue in this particular case. However, appropriation rules and provision are closely linked since the type and number of animals harvested determines provision in the future. Appropriation rules should mesh with local conditions. The latter include the type of habitat available and the fact that most of the land is privately held in the two counties. Neither seem to have any specific bearing on the type of rules.
Requirement 3 addresses rule changes. Since no formal structure exists (yet) within the Quality Deer Management Association there is no official forum to address rule changes. It is also not expected that compliance will be 100% within the geographic area, thus individuals who are opposed to the rules will not join the Association. However, meetings are organized in order to discuss Association principles and thus provide a forum to voice opinions.
Requirements 4 and 5 address monitoring and graduated sanctions. Neither device exists formally in the Association. However, informal monitoring is possible and likely. Hunters are proud of their kills and neighbors and/or friends usually find out about size, gender, and antler growth of the deer taken. It is very likely that someone who is known to subscribe to quality deer management and who breaks the rule of not shooting small bucks will be discovered and friends and neighbors adhering to quality deer management principles will use emotional sanctions and put pressure on the individual not to deviate in the future. It is also likely that the degree of emotional sanctions which are put on the individual will vary depending on circumstances. For example, if a young hunter has never shot a deer and when presented with the opportunity to shoot a small buck, say, at the end to the deer hunting season, gives in to it, will face less stringent sanctioning than someone who has shot many bucks in years past but was too greedy to forgo a chance to shoot a buck. It is likely that pressure will also be put on individuals who are not subscribing to quality deer management practices to comply. The more people subscribe, the stronger will be the pressure on those not subscribing to join.
Requirement 6 calls for a conflict resolution forum at low cost. This also does not exist formally. Conflicts must currently be resolved informally since no formal rule breaking occurs when smaller bucks are shot within the legal framework set by the DNR.
Requirement 7, minimal recognition of rights to organize apply in this case. If the Quality Deer Management Association were to organize formally, it would be able to take recourse to the legal system in case of disputes.
A national Quality Deer Management Association exists and it
is possible for more formal local Associations to become nested within the larger system. This would fulfill requirement 8. Currently the local Quality Deer Management Association is considered a (informal) branch of the national Association.
The desired performance of the Quality Deer Management Association is a change in the composition of the deer herd toward older male deer and a lower overall population. Based on Ostrom's requirements one would predict that the Quality Deer Management Association would not be an enduring institution. The potential for outsiders to acquire benefits due to Association efforts is large, monitoring and sanctioning are not formalized and boundaries are not well defined.
However, informal monitoring and sanctioning efforts may work as well or better than formal ones at the local level. Peer pressure can be a significant and effective way to discipline those who deviate from desired behavior. This not only applies to members but also to non-members. The Association wants to allow flexibility within their organization because its main mode of operation is through persuasion. Individuals cannot be forced to join and the rewards are not immediate. Big bucks take time to grow and free riders may be quite numerous, especially in the early phase when only few "members" have been recruited. Another factor becomes operative which may work to persuade people to adhere to Association principles. If enough people join the Association and/or subscribe to the principles to affect the composition of the deer herd, more larger bucks will be sighted and trophy hunters are more likely to hold out for a big buck, and forego a small one. Hunters only have one buck tag, and knowing that a large buck has been sighted in the area, they are less likely to shoot a small buck which comes along in order to have the chance at getting a large one. Since larger bucks are more difficult to harvest (they are more wary or perhaps smarter), the number of large bucks may not necessarily go back down to previously low levels although there may be more hunting pressure. If people realize that the sighting of more large bucks is due to Quality Deer Management practices, they may also be more likely to be at least supportive.
The Association also wants to retain some flexibility in terms of tolerating some harvest of small bucks by young hunters, handicapped hunters, and/or elderly hunters who may not have the opportunity to shoot larger bucks which may require more effort and/or to provide those hunters with the feeling of pride which hunters (still) derive from shooting a buck (even a small one) over a doe. This flexibility may facilitate recruitment since new "members" commit to the principles of the organization but would perhaps face only mild sanctions (peer pressure) if they do shoot an "occasional" small buck.
The question arises, why do individuals "join" the Association at all? Free-riders exist and the Association allows some flexibility for taking small bucks. Cost of membership and organization are nonzero, for example the time and effort of organizing and attending meetings. The benefits, however, can be had irrespective of the amount of effort, time, and money put into the Association by the individual. Non-members have equal access to benefits from a successful coalition as members. A possible explanation may be a strong desire by some individuals to want to solve the multi-person prisoner's dilemma of deer management. Dawes et al. (1990) found that group identity explains a dramatic increase in cooperation. Cooperation is necessary in order to attain a threshold level of larger bucks in order to increase the probability of a hunter shooting a larger buck. This will have the desired effect of individual hunters passing up smaller bucks in order to have the opportunity to bag
a larger one. Sutter (1995b) pointed out that there are non-hunting benefits to joining the Association. Quality Deer
Management provides a forum where information on deer hunting and management can be exchanged, it serves as a networking device with people of like minds on deer management, it offers social benefits of meeting people with similar interests, and Quality Deer Management offers goods and services that may be of interested to members (e.g. signs, brochures and booklets).
There has been a noticeable increase in the number of larger bucks in the last few years which is not only due to Association activities but also to the fact that non-members are increasingly foregoing small bucks. However, the deer herd is expected to reach record levels in 1995 throughout the State of Wisconsin. (Wallenfang 1995) Thus, it can be hypothesized that Association activities have had some effect on buck hunting as members and non-members are shooting fewer small bucks. However, the size of deer herds has been increasing which is due to the fact that members and non-members are not shooting more antlerless deer. On average hunters only apply for one bonus permit (Wallenfang 1995). This indicates that hunters are primarily motivated by trophy hunting rather than meat hunting.
3. Alternatives To The Quality Deer Management Association
a) Regulation: No Small Bucks
One structural alternative to the Quality Deer Management Association that could lead to the desired outcome of having smaller bucks grow up to maturity is to modify the hunting regulations to prohibit the taking of small bucks. In order to reduce the number of antlerless deer, more antlerless deer permits could be given out. However, even though in some areas up to six bonus permits for antlerless deer can be applied for, on average only one is actually given out. In order to force people to take does each hunter could be required to take at least, say, one antlerless deer per deer season. Monitoring may be a problem, however. A reason why not more antlerless deer are taken is that many hunters and their families prefer other types of meat to venison. Forcing hunters to shoot more does and fawns will create the problem of what to do with the meat if the family cannot or will not use it. Current law does not allow the selling of venison. A change in the law would eliminate this problem and give added incentive to "meat hunting" if the venison can be sold on the market.
Sutter (1995a) believes that it would be difficult for the DNR to restrict the size of antlered bucks which can legally be shot because of the opposition from many deer hunters. Wallenfang (DNR) indicated that a DNR survey revealed that hunters are interested in big-buck management but are opposed to do it through regulation by the DNR. Wallenfang also believes that enforcement would be a problem, e.g. hunters would have difficulties estimating antler size correctly. Reduction in herd size by issuance of more antlerless deer permits is not believed to be effective as hunters are not taking advantage of the currently available bonus permits (on average only one permit is applied for). Wallenfang believes that hunters' preferences for trophy hunting are responsible for the low number of antlerless deer taken.
b) Regulation: Lottery
A lottery system entails a restriction on the number of permits which are given out to hunters. Deer hunters would have to apply for a deer permit and the predetermined number of tags would be allocated by lottery among the applicants. The lottery system would apply to buck tags only since the goal would also be to reduce the overall herd size by taking more antlerless deer. This system would restrict the number of bucks which can legally be taken. More bucks would survive and grow bigger over time. Lotteries currently exist in many western states for large game.
The resulting performance would be an increase in the number of larger bucks since most bucks taken are young bucks and a restriction on the number of bucks that can be taken will allow more young bucks to grow up. Overall herd size would not be affected, however. The desired balance of the deer herd can be created provided some fine-tuning is possible and undertaken, i.e. knowledge of current composition of the deer herd is known and changes can be observed allowing adjustments in the number of permits.
Hunters like to shoot bucks, however, and many are opposed to a lottery system as a way to limit the number of male deer which can be shot for the same reason they oppose hunting restrictions on the size of bucks.
C. WHOSE PREFERENCES COUNT?
The property rights to the resource (deer herd) lie with the State. The DNR manages the deer herd. The Department obtains partial funding from the sale of timber on state land and hunting licenses. Since deer browsing and buck rubs on trees affect regeneration of trees, especially when the deer herd is large, the DNR has an interest in keeping the deer herds from getting too large. Since money from hunting licenses make up part of DNR funding the Department is also responsive to hunters' needs, especially when hunters are well-organized and vocal. Hunters have an interest in deer management which will make it more likely that deer are taken and that those taken are "respectable" (large antlers). Landowners can also be quite vocal when crop damage due to deer becomes a problem. These diverse interests create incompatibilities in terms of deer management. Landowners who are interested in minimizing crop damage want small deer herds, hunters want large herds to guarantee "successful" hunts but also want large bucks because they are prestigious to shoot and many hunters prefer shooting a small buck over an antlerless deer.
Attempts to reduce the deer herds have been limited to giving out multiple deer licenses. Since hunters' preferences are for antlered deer, the effect has not been very large. The composition of the deer herd has only worsened as many small bucks are taken but only relatively few antlerless deer. Landowners who experience crop damage have been able to obtain additional antlerless deer permits to take deer on their property.
When the DNR contemplates significant changes in deer hunting regulations, public meetings are held where the pros and cons of the proposed changes are discussed. The group of hunters which opposes any new restrictions on deer hunting activities has been quite successful in not getting proposed restrictions instituted. Thus, while it would be in many hunters' interest to restrict the bagging of small bucks, individual hunters are against legal restrictions. Perhaps they are hoping to free-ride on the commitment of other hunters to forego small bucks while still preserving their option to shoot a small buck if no large buck crosses their path or they may be generally opposed to additional "government interference".
While there is pressure on the DNR to reduce herd size, because of the effect of large herds on forest regeneration which affects timber revenues and landowner complaints about crop damage, so far hunters have been successful in preventing changes in regulation which they deem undesirable.
Thus, the interests of those hunters who oppose changes in hunting regulations seem to count. Hunters make up the majority of "members" of the Quality Deer Management Association and their interests will carry weight within the Association as well.
IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Management of deer herds can best be viewed as a common-pool- resource problem. Joint impact, high exclusion cost, and the requirement of a minimum coalition to affect composition are features of the deer herd system, while individual deer have incompatible-use characteristics. The DNR is responsible for deer management. This is done through habitat management and hunting regulations (DNR 1994) at the system or habitat level. The structural feature of voluntary relationships is thus placed within this institutional set-up.
In the last few years, more and more people perceived the Wisconsin deer herds to be too large and unbalanced, a performance outcome of the structural feature. Most of the deer shot during hunting season are yearling bucks. Approximately five years ago, the Quality Deer Management Association formed in Southern Wisconsin in order to try and influence hunters' behavior, encouraging hunters to shoot more antlerless deer to reduce herd size and to forego small bucks in order to create a larger stock of bigger bucks. The Quality Deer Management Association thus responds to the perceived need of interested parties (mainly hunters) while allowing rules that are more flexible and better suited to local demands than if the DNR instituted a state-wide policy of a lottery for permits or regulation prohibiting the shooting of young bucks.
While trying to increase the number of larger bucks has shown some success, the goal of reducing herd size has not yet come within reach as hunters started to forego smaller bucks but have not taken antlerless deer instead. Thus, the voluntary Quality Deer Management Association has only been partially successful in moving toward its desired performance outcomes.
Based on Ostrom's (1990) tentative criteria for enduring voluntary organizations, the Quality Deer Management Association has some potential for becoming an enduring organization. Decisions which will be made in the near future about a more formal structure will partly determine whether its potential for becoming a long-lasting institution will increase or not. It is also possible that too much success can threaten the organization's survival as there will be no need for it if all or most hunters adopt the desired attitude and behavior. However, other aspects of quality deer management may become more prominent (e.g. declining deer habitat as development proceeds in some areas) and the Association may be able to redirect its focus.
DEFINITIONS
SITUATION: Situation refers to individual (e.g. preferences, values, information processing), community (e.g. number of decision makers and shared individual characteristics), and goods characteristics (i.e. those which determine human interdependence). (Schmid 1987)
STRUCTURE: Structure comprises institutional setup and property rights. (Schmid 1987)
PERFORMANCE: Performance is the outcome for a given situation under a choice of rights and institutions. (Schmid 1987) INCOMPATIBLE-USE GOOD: An incompatible-use good is a good "that has two or more physical uses and users that are incompatible" (Schmid 1987, 43).
JOINT-IMPACT GOOD: This is a good that "can enter two or more persons' utility irreducibly (Schmid 1987, 75). "[M]arginal cost of another user is zero over some range" (ibid.). HIGH-EXCLUSION-COST GOOD: This is a good "where if the good exists for one user it is costly to exclude others" (Schmid 1987, 46).
COMMON-POOL RESOURCE: This term "refers to a natural or man-made resource system that is sufficiently large as to make it costly (but not impossible) to exclude potential beneficiaries from obtaining benefits from its use" (Ostrom 1990, 30). Common-pool resources are characterized by difficulty of exclusion and a high degree of subtractability of resource units, i.e. resource units extracted by one person are not available to another. (Ostrom et al. 1994,6) In the case discussed here, an additional feature is that resource units (deer) move and that management of the entire resource stock (whole herd) is required in order to show an effect on the resource stock (herd size) and composition of the stock (buck-doe ratio). Individual efforts will yield no significant response unless other individuals join in the effort to reach a certain threshold level.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dawes, R., A.J.C. van de Kragt, and J.M. Orbell. 1990. In: Mansbridge, J. (ed.). Beyond
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Department of Natural Resources (DNR). 1994. 1994 Wisconsin Hunting Regulations.
Ostrom, E., R. Gardner, J. Walker. 1994. Rules, Games, and Common Pool Resources. University of Michigan Press.
Ostrom, E. 1990. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective
Action. Cambridge University Press.
Schmid, A. 1987. Property, Power, & Public Choice. An Inquiry into Law and Economics. Praeger Publishers.
Schelling, T. 1978. Micromotives and Macrobehavior. Norton. Sutter, Greer. 1995a. Co-founder of the Quality Deer Management Association. Personal Communication. March 1995.
Sutter, Greer. 1995b. Co-founder of the Quality Deer Management Association. Personal Communication. May 1995.
Wallenfang, K. Department of Natural Resources, Fisheries and
Wildlife. Personal Communication. April 1995.