Journal Files A.A.S
Phosphate Mining Econometric Study (Crocker, J. Law and Econ., 1971)
Good= Air & surface of citrus leaves
Behavioral characteristics: farmers have bounded rationality and land sellers are opportunistic.
| Situation | Structure | Performance |
| IUG between industry and farmers.
HEC among farmers (and among tourists).. Many farmers. One phosphate firm. Many tourists. Did information change? Was monitoring cost higher than expected? |
1. Industry is factor owner.
Market trade allowed. 2. Farmers own via Air Poll. Control District; injunction probable. Detail: monitoring limited?? |
1. Free riders. Farmers make no bid
(latent group).
Hypothesis: Land value is lowered by pollution (pollution coefficient is significant and negative). Finding: not significant. No bid from tourists. 2. Hypothesis: pollution coef. Insignificant--farmers either get paid or poll. stops. Tourists lose. Finding: Poll. Coef. Sig. & - |
Good= Air and pasture
| Same situation as above, but fewer
ranchers.
Producer surplus-- Immobile assets of phosphate industry. Agency monitoring costs. |
2a. Injunction probable.
Ranchers collect volunteer donations to lobby the District?? 2b. Damages only. 3. Emission standard. Easier to administer. Non-exchangeable. Tourists implicit part owner?? |
2a. Finding: Pollution coef.
Sig. +Ranchers capture surplus. 2b. Hypothesis: No surplus to ranchers. Poll. coef. Insig. 3. Hyp: Poll. coef. Insig. Industry costs up. Tourists benefit because landowners can't sell. |
Question for alternative # 3: Is this performance inefficient because of the barrier to trade; or is the tourist "part-owner" just refusing to sell?
Land value = f (citrus prices, land fertility, pollution level)
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN:
O1 O2 O3 X O4 O5 O6
O = observations (predicted land values at various times)
X = change in institution.
\810-SSP\Crocker-ssp
If you have any questions or comments, please email schmid@pilot.msu.edu
