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CONSCIOUSNESS SEMINAR Fall 2005
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PHL 860 Home | General Information | Schedule | Assignments
| Resources | On-Line
Papers |
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Term:
Fall 2005 |
Instructor:
Jennifer Susse |
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Office: 519
South Kedzie |
E-mail: susse@msu.edu
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Mailbox: 503
South Kedzie Hall |
Web Page: http://www.msu.edu/user/susse |
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Phone:
353-9377 |
Office
Hours: Thursday 4:00–6:00, or by apt. |
·
The Nature
of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Block, Flanagan and Guzeldere (eds.). MIT Press, 1997
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David
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
Oxford University Press, 1996
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Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: An Introduction.
Oxford University Press, 2003
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Internet Resources and Handouts
Philosophy
of Mind has long since abandoned the Cartesian conceptual of mind as an
irreducibly non-physical thing. In fact, physicalism is its uncontested
starting point. But physicalist theories have a hard time accounting for the
existence of qualitative or phenomenal conscious experience. Phenomenal
consciousness is the ineffable what it is like experience we all have when
e.g., we are in pain, see the color red, or taste a ripe peach. Recently, there
has been a growing consensus that we can’t just ignore something so central to
human (and nonhuman?) experience. No theory of mind should be considered a
success unless it offers an explanation of phenomenal consciousness. We will
look at several philosophical debates over phenomenal consciousness and attempt
to answer the following questions: What is it? Does it have a structure? Does
it have a function? And, to what extend does it depend on physical stuff?
The class will be run seminar-style. I will lead the first couple of meetings of the semester, but after that you will be responsible for presenting papers and serving as commentators. Student presentations should be similar to APA style presentations, in which you present a mini paper about the reading. Afterwards, a fellow student will comment on your presentation.