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Philosophy of Mind |
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PHL 462 Home | General Information | Schedule | Assignments
| Resources | On-Line
Papers |
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Term:
Fall 2005 |
Instructor:
Jennifer Susse |
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Office: 519
South Kedzie |
E-mail: susse@msu.edu
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Mailbox: 503
South Kedzie Hall |
Web Page: http://www.msu.edu/user/susse |
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Phone:
353-9377 |
Office
Hours: Thursday 4:00–6:00, or by apt. |
·
The
Nature of Consciousness: Philosophical Debates. Block, Flanagan and Guzeldere (eds.).
MIT Press, 1997
·
David
Chalmers, The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory.
Oxford University Press, 1996
·
Susan Blackmore, Consciousness: An Introduction.
Oxford University Press, 2003
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Internet Resources and Handouts
Philosophy
of Mind has long since abandoned the Cartesian conceptual of mind as an
irreducibly non-physical thing. In fact, physicalism is its uncontested
starting point. But physicalist theories have a hard time accounting for the
existence of qualitative or phenomenal conscious experience. Phenomenal
consciousness is the ineffable what it is like experience we all have
when e.g., we are in pain, see the color red, or taste a ripe peach. Recently,
there has been a growing consensus that we can’t just ignore something so
central to human (and nonhuman?) experience. No theory of mind should be
considered a success unless it offers an explanation of phenomenal
consciousness. We will look at several philosophical debates over phenomenal
consciousness and attempt to answer the following questions: What is it? Does
it have a structure? Does it have a function? And, to what extend does it
depend on physical stuff?
The class will be run seminar-style. I will lead the first couple of meetings of the semester, but after that you will be responsible for presenting papers and serving as commentators. Student presentations should be similar to APA style presentations, in which you present a mini paper about the reading. Afterwards, a fellow student will comment on your presentation.