“The Electoral Consequences of Political Corruption.” With Miriam Golden and Seth Hill. Under review (September 2007).

Abstract

We study the political careers of members of the Italian Chamber of Deputies during the first eleven postwar legislatures (1948-1994). We utilize a unique dataset from the Italian Ministry of Justice reporting the transmission to the Chamber of more than 3,000 requests for the removal of parliamentary immunity from deputies suspected of criminal wrongdoing. We find that judicial investigation did not discourage deputies from standing for reelection but reduced the probability of achieving reelection. Further analysis shows that judicial inquiry damages the electoral fortunes of legislators in only the last (Eleventh) legislature of our sample, while otherwise Italian voters fail to hold politicians accountable. Our work accords with a multiple equilibrium theory of corruption, and suggests that anti-corruption efforts succeed when tightly orchestrated and extremely rapid. Empirically, our results for Italy are not much different than for other democratic countries about which information is available, and have implications for theories of political accountability in democratic countries.