Chang, Eric, and Miriam Golden. 2007. “Electoral Systems, District Magnitude and Corruption.” British Journal of Political Science 37 (1): 115 - 37.

Abstract

We analyze the relationship between electoral systems and corruption in a large sample of contemporary democratic nations. Whereas previous studies have shown that closed- list proportional representation is associated with greater (perceived) corruption than open-list PR, we demonstrate that this relationship fails to hold once district magnitude is considered. The theory underlying our study draws on work on “the personal vote” that suggests that the incentives to amass resources — and perhaps even to do so illegally — increase with district magnitude in open- list settings but decrease in closed- list contexts. Extending this insight, we show that political corruption gets more (less) severe as district magnitude increases under open- list PR (closed- list PR) systems. In addition, once district magnitude exceeds a certain threshold — our estimates are that this is as low as 15 — corruption is greater under open list than closed list. Only at small district magnitudes (below 15) is closed-list PR associated with more corruption, as conventionally held. Our results hold for alternate measures of corruption, for different sets of countries analyzed, for different measures of district magnitude, and regardless of whether the political system is presidential or parliamentary and the number of parties.

Using an objective measure of corruption in public works contracting, we also present corroborating evidence across Italian electoral districts. In Italy’s open- list environment in the period prior to 1994, larger districts are more susceptible to corruption than smaller ones.